KARGIL : Timeline of the war

Many of you might have heard about the Kargil war, an armed conflict that took place between Pakistani inflitrators and The Indian army between May and July 1999 in the Kargil district of Kashmir and along the line of control (LOC). The then prime minister Late Sh. Atal Bihari Bajpayee declared this war as Operation Vijay, and this operation was declared successfull on 26 july and till date we celebrate 26 july as 'KARGIL VIJAY DIWAS' .

The Indian Airforce also launched an Operation "Op. Safed Sagar" to provide logistical and air support to the army, but the terrain of Kargil had made it a very tough task. The total number of Indian casualities stood at 527 including soldiers and officers who led and fought from the front.

Lets have a look at how this conflict began and the heroic deeds of our soldiers .

There were three major phases to the Kargil War. First, Pakistan captured several strategic high points in the Indian-controlled section of Kashmir. India responded by first capturing strategic transportation routes, then militarily pushing Pakistani forces back across the Line of Control.

THE FAVOURITE PAKISTANI DEED - TO INFILTRATE IN OUR TERRITORY :

During winters both the armies leave their respective posts from the top peaks of Himalayas and fall back as it is very cold up there. But this time the pakis had planned something else, that is to capture the Indian posts and have an eye on National highway 1 .

The infiltrators included soldiers from Special Services Group as well as 4-7 batallions of the Northern Light Infantory(at that time it was part of paramilitary force of pakistan) and its also reported that they were accompanied by Kashmiri terrorists and Afghan mercenaries.

INTENTION OF THE INFILTRATION : The pakistani army and its terror or research wing whatever you call it ISI planned an operation by the name Operation Badr, with an intention to separate Ladakh and Kashmir and deteriorate the logistic supply between these two strategically important positions. The result would be loose hand of India on the Siachin glacier region .

Several reasons are given for such infiltrations , I am listing the most prominent one here :

: The major objective behind the current infiltration of the Pakistan backed militants seems to be in continuation with its larger goal of internationalising the Kashmir issue by calling for either the UN intervention or a third party mediation.

:The second part of this strategy is embedded within the first one – to provoke India to retaliate, so that the issue could get internationalised. The fact that the militants have been supplied with Stinger missiles suggests that Pakistan anticipated air attacks from the Indian side.

: The third reason underlying Pakistan’s strategy could be to revive the insurgency in Kashmir. In the recent past, the insurgency situation in Kashmir was coming well under control, through the ongoing army operations.

:Fourthly, Pakistan’s policy is to make Kashmir appear as the “nuclear flash point” of the sub continent. With both countries becoming nuclear powers and a section of analysts in the subcontinent and elsewhere strongly believing that any clash between the “immature” India and Pakistan would result in nuclear war, Pakistan expected that the pressure would be greater on India to immediately solve the Kashmir issue.

: At the strategic level, Pakistan’s expectations were probably be to direct the focus of India and the Army to Kargil and to areas surrounding Kargil, it would be easier for the militants to infiltrate through other entry points. The second strategic objective would be to control NH-1A, the national highway from Srinagar to Leh. Even if the militants could control the highway for a short period, it would be sufficient to score a point or two. Pakistan was well aware that the militants cannot hold the highway for long, because of Indian army operations and the international pressure. Probably, Pakistan might have thought that by the time, India begin its counter efforts, it could open the diplomatic channel and take credit for seeking for peace in the subcontinent. The fact that Nawaz spoke about sending his Foreign Minister Aziz confirmed this assumption. Thirdly, at a broader level, the ISI was sure to increase its activities elsewhere in India, through aiding various fundamental groups in India, especially in the South. The Police in Tamil Nadu had recovered explosive devices in many parts of Madras, which proved this point.

The possible chances of such deeds were mentioned in the IDR published in July 1989, by the name Op Topac, which was not taken seriousy then. IDR published a sequel to Op Topac titled "KASHMIR ON THE EDGE : A WAR SCENARIO". No one took special notice. In 1999, we should realize that once again IDR had anticipated likely Pak plans. Here are some excerpts :

1. Concentration of forces opposite Amritsar, Gurdaspur, Pathankot, Jammu and Akhnur and tactical regrouping of forces in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK).

2. Increased Air and LC violations and visible movement of reserves opposite selected sectors.

3. Increase in terrorism in Jammu and Punjab; lines of communication and railways to be the main targets.

4. Appearance of well organized guerrilla forces capable of pitched battles. These will be armed with sophisticated weapons which would include missiles, heavy mortars and Stinger missiles.

5. Collapse of authority and essential services in the Valley; communalisation of the situation in Jammu and contiguous areas.

6. Stepping up of attacks on VIPs, central establishments including military supply bases and convoys.

7. Use of land mines operated by remote control to make highways and movement of security forces unsafe.

8. Establishment of guerrilla strongholds daring security forces to attack them.

9. 'Op Mushtary' (Jupitar) will commence at a certain stage of Zarb-e-Kamil and is likely to take the following form:

   1. Extensive and continued firing including artillery and mortar fire all along the LC.

   2. Attack on isolated posts on the LC particularly in remote and difficult areas.

   3. Capture of important but less defencible tactical features on the Shamsabari Range, Kargil, Shyok Valley - Soltora range and in the Punch - Rajauri sector

It was according to these strategies that Pakistan infiltrated the areas.

Positions where heavy infiltration had occured:

Because of the extreme winter weather in Kashmir, it was common practice for the Indian and Pakistan Army to abandon forward posts and reoccupy them in the spring. That particular spring, the Pakistan Army reoccupied the forward posts before the scheduled time.

According to General Ved Malik, the bulk of the infiltration occurred in April,1999.

Pakistani intrusions took place in the heights of the lower Mushkoh Valley, along the Marpo La ridgeline in Dras, in Kaksar near Kargil, in the Batalik sector east of the Indus River, on the heights above of the Chorbatla sector where the LOC turns North and in the Turtok sector south of the Siachen area.

INFORMATION ABOUT THE INFILTRATION :

The first information of infiltration to the Indian army was given by a local shepherd Tashi Namgyal, who was looking for his missing yak when he saw the Pakistani intruders. As he recalls:

"On the morning of May 3, I had moved up with one of my friends some 5 km along Jubbar Langpa stream in search of my missing yak. I was scanning the mountainside through a pair of binoculars. And then I saw groups of men in Pathan attire and camouflaged Pakistani soldiers digging bunkers. Some of them were armed, however, it was not possible for me to ascertain their numbers. But one thing I was sure -- they had come from the other side of the LoC."

"I came down and promptly informed the nearest post of the Indian Army. My information alerted Indian army and they cross-checked and found that my information about the intrusion of Pakistani soldiers was correct,"

As soon as the Indian army was informed about the infiltration a patrol party was sent as it was thought initially that the numbers of infiltrators might be very less, but the patrol party was ambushed and one officer and five brave soldiers of the Indian army were tortured and killed mercilessly.

The martyrs included Capt. Saurabh Kalia(4 Jat Regiment), and Sepoy Arjun Ram, Sepoy Bhanwar Lal Bagaria, Sepoy Bhikaram, Sepoy Moola Ram, and Sepoy Naresh Singh, their mutitaled body were returned to the Indian army on 09 June,1999.

A line Capt Kalia always used to say to his mother "Maa, tum dekhna ek din aisa kaam karunga, saari duniya mein mera naam hoga". During 15 May to 7 June Captain Saurabh and other soldiers were facing heavy and very inhuman torture by Pakistani side, when the body was returned Indian Army seen body of a young officer and soldiers with punctured eyes before removing them, breaking most of their teeth and bones, fracturing their skulls, cutting the lips, chipping of nose, chopping off limbs and private organs of the soldiers, and finally shooting them dead, as evidenced by bullet wounds to the temple. The post-mortem also confirmed the injuries were inflicted ante-mortem (before death).

The ambush on the patrol party gave the signal to the army that this was not the every other infiltration from the pakistan side, It was something very big. The operation of inflitration was codenamed as "OPERATION BADR" by the pakis.

THE WAR BEGINS

On 9 May, 1999 heavy shelling began from the pakistani side and it damaged the ammunition dump in Kargil, which incurred a total loss of 127 crores on the Indian army, on the very first day.

Round of meetings and briefing began in the North block and the ops ROOM of the Indian Army, the situation was briefed to the Prime Minister and Defence minister.

Movement of troops began on 10 May from, Kashmir valley to Kargil sector after infiltration was observed in Dras, Kaksar, and Mushkoh sectors.

On 26 May IAF launches air strikes against infiltrators under the operation code name "Safed sagar", they got initial success but on 27 May, came two very shocking news for the IAF and the nation , Two

IAF aircraft one MiG-21 and one MiG-27 were shot down by an Anza Mk-II of Pakistan army air defence corp;Flt. Lt.Kambampati Nachiketa was taken as prisoner of war. Nachiketa was repatriated to India on 3 June 1999. He was handed over to the International Committee of the Red Cross in Pakistan and was subsequently repatriated over the Indian border check post at Attari on the Amritsar-to-Lahore road. Nachiketa described his experiences in captivity as "difficult to be described in words" and said he felt "death would have been a better solution".

Sqn Ldr Ahuja stayed over enemy positions to help the rescue attempts knowing full well the existence of enemy surface-to-air missiles in the area. However, his MiG-21MF fighter, C-1539,was hit by a shoulder-fired FIM-92 Stinger. Ahuja gave a radio call – "Hercules, something has hit my plane, possibility of missile hit cannot be ruled out, I am ejecting over...(location).". IAF authorities lost track of his aircraft and all communication shortly afterward. A post-mortem examination conducted at the Srinagar Base Hospital claimed that Ahuja had landed safely after ejecting from his plane, but had been killed later by Pakistani soldiers.

The killing of Sqn Ldr Ahuja infuriated the IAF even more, but the decisions were taken wisely regarding the use of air support, but on 28 May IAF MI-17 was shot down by Pakistan; four air crew were killed in action.

After the intial success in taking down two MIG's and one MI17, Pakistan's artillery stepped up the attack and started launching shells on NH-1a from 1 June, making the movement of Indian troops a tedious task.

The infiltrators, apart from being equipped with small arms and grenade launchers, were also armed with mortars, artillery and anti-aircraft guns. Many posts were also heavily mined, with India later stating to have recovered more than 8,000 anti-personnel mines according to an ICBL report.Pakistan's reconnaissance was done through unmanned aerial vehicles and AN/TPQ-36 Firefinder radars supplied by the US.

The initial Indian attacks were aimed at controlling the hills overlooking NH 1, with high priority being given to the stretches of the highway near the town of Kargil. The majority of posts along the LOC were adjacent to the highway, and therefore the recapture of nearly every infiltrated post increased both the territorial gains and the security of the highway. The protection of this route and the recapture of the forward posts were thus ongoing objectives throughout the war.

Indian troops first targetted the Tololing complex and Tiger Hill in Dras, which dominated the Srinagar-Leh route.

Recapturing Tololing: There was no mercy in this moonscape. As Col. Ravindranath recalls "Indian soldiers in Drass have by now got used to interruptions in radio messages. These are frequency intercepts by the Pakistani Army. They cut in with sophisticated electronic jammers to blank out radio sets. Sometimes, mujahideen and Pakistani soldiers shout curses and war cries."

By 8 p.m. on June 12, the Rajputana Rifles assault team was ready behind big boulders just 300 m short of their target. Shortly before the charge, Ravindranath gave a final pep talk to his men. "I have given you what you wanted. Now, you have to give me what I want." The men were so charged that a JCO Bhanwer Singh interjected to say, "Sir, come to the Tololing Top in the morning. We will meet you there."

At 4.10 a.m. on June 13, there was no such problem when Colonel M.B. Ravindranath, commanding officer of the 2 Rajputana Rifles, radioed the commander of the 8 Mountain Division Major-General Mohinder Puri, camping some 20 km away. It was a simple, terse message: "Sir, I'm on Tololing Top."

It is the place that claimed Major Rajesh Adhikari, Captain Vivek Gupta and Lt-Colonel G. Viswanathan, the place that has accounted for more than half the dead in this war.

In return, the heights above Drass valley were free from intruders and a critical section of the 510-km long Srinagar-Kargil-Leh highway was safe. "Tololing being bang on the road, it choked our throats," says a field commander. "That pressure is now off."

The victory earned Ravindranath and his men a rare, direct "well-done" from army chief V. P. Malik.

Once Tololing was taken, it took just six days for Indian troops to notch up a string of successes by evicting well-entrenched intruders on four nearby outposts with names that have become the talking point of cocktail circuits and village gatherings - Point 4590, Rocky Knob, Hump and Point 5140. It lead to the recapture of a similarly strategic height of Tiger Hill.

Recapturing Tiger Hill: ( In words of General V.P. Malik, then COAS )

Tiger Hill is 5062 metre high with sharp conical features, which stands majestically among the mountaintops a few kilometres north of Dras. One cannot miss it, or help admire it, as one drives along National Highway 1A (NH 1A) from Zojila to Kargil. During the Kargil war, it was a delight for photojournalists as it provided some of the best pictures of that war. Tiger Hill was picturesque, dominating and difficult, and soon became a war symbol to every one in India!

From Tiger Hill, the enemy (Pak troops of 12 Northern Light Infantry, supported by Special Services Group, artillery and engineers) had a clear view of NH 1A from the Dras transit camp to Bhimbat, and the road leading to Marpola on the Line of Control (LoC). They could effectively interdict vehicular movement on these roads with observed artillery fire. It was clear to us from the beginning that unless Tiger Hill and Point 4875, which is located 2 km to its South-West, were secured, movement along NH 1A will never be safe. Although Point 4875 was closer and dominated a larger stretch of NH 1A, Tiger Hill occupied by the enemy was a lot more difficult to attack.

In the second week of May, 1999, 8 Sikh moving from Udhampur to the Kashmir valley was diverted to Dras. On arrival, the Brigade Commander launched the unit into battle without acclimatisation and snow clothing to clear Tiger Hill. The unit suffered heavy casualties in its attempt to get close to the objective. It was then ordered to occupy dominating heights on the South-Eastern part of Tiger Hill, and to the North in the area called 'Parion ka Talab'. We did not make any further attempts to capture Tiger Hill for the next six weeks till we had cleared the approaches and were fully ready for it.

On 27 June 1999, I visited Headquarters 8 Mountain Division and 56 Mountain Brigade at Dras. That evening, 2 Rajputana Rifle was preparing to attack Three Pimples, another very difficult feature west of Tololing. To encourage the unit and to wish it good luck, I asked the Divisional Commander, Major-Gen Mohinder Puri, if I could be connected on the telephone to Col Ravindranath, its Commanding Officer. The Commanding Officer with his small party was then located near the Forming Up Place (FUP) for the assault. Ravindranath was taken aback when he learnt about the telephone call from the Chief. He spoke to me in whispers, probably due to close proximity of the enemy. I enquired about the battalion and wished him and his men good luck in their mission.

After speaking to Ravindranath, I asked Major General Puri what his next objective would be. As expected, he said that 192 Mountain Brigade was preparing to attack Tiger Hill and Point 4875 after a few days.

Tiger Hill extends about 2200 metres from West to East and about 1000 metres North to South. The main extension is towards West on which there are two prominent protrusions. The first, approximately 500 metres West of Tiger Hill, had been named 'India Gate', and the second, another 300 metres to the West, was called 'Helmet'. Approximately one company of Pakistan 12 Northern Light Infantry held the whole feature. 18 Grenadiers along with 8 Sikh, which were already in the area, were tasked to capture Tiger Hill on the night of 3/4 July, 1999. They were provided a team of the High Altitude Warfare School, adequate artillery, engineer and other support. The Air Force too engaged Tiger Hill on 2/3 July 1999 and had several bull's eyes on its missions.

The assault began at 1900 hours on 3 July 1999 with direct and indirect firing by artillery. It was a multi-directional infantry assault. 8 Sikh provided the firm base and engaged the enemy from 'obvious' approaches as part of a deception plan. 18 Grenadiers moved towards the objective from the South and North East. The weather assisted the battalions in achieving surprise. Lt. Balwan Singh led the Ghatak Platoon (Commando) of 18 Grenadiers on the most difficult, North-Eastern Approach. His Platoon make use of the rope to reach the top of the Tiger Hill at 4.30 hours and totally surprised the enemy that had already suffered due to heavy artillery shelling and air attacks. In t he ensuring hand-to-hand fighting, the enemy lost 10-12 personnel. 18 Grenadiers suffered six fatal casualties.

Grenadier Yogendar Singh Yadav, who was in the lead on the rope, and wounded badly, earned India's highest gallantry award of Param Vir Chakra. The Ghatak Platoon with some reinforcements firmed in on the Tiger Hill top, but throughout the day came under enemy fire from the Western Spur. This position (Western Spur) was cleared by a very gallant and highly motivated action by 8 Sikh on the night of 4-5 July, 1999. They beat back a fierce counter-attack led by two Pak officers on the early morning of 15 July 1999 and also captured 'India Gate' and 'Helmet'.

It was a hard psychological blow to the enemy who, to start with on July 4, denied even the existence of such a feature and labeled the entire operations as a figment of the imagination. Whereas this victory broke the back of the entire Pak resistance. In India, a wave of jubilation and relief overtook the mood of the people. This was the greatest victory of the Kargil war.

CITATION OF PARAMVEER CHAKRA

CAPTAIN VIKRAM BATRA (His favourite quotes "YEH DIL MAANGE MOR")

13 JAMMU AND KASHMIR RIFLES (IC 57556)

During ‘Operation Vijay’, on 20 June 1999, Captain Vikram Batra, Commander Delta Company was tasked to attack Point 5140. Captain Batra with his company skirted around the feature from the East and maintaining surprise reached within assaulting distance of the enemy. Captain Batra reorganized his column and motivated his men to physically assault the enemy positions. Leading from the front, he in a daredevil assault, pounced on the enemy and killed four of them in a hand-to hand fight. On 7 July 1999, in another operation in the area Pt 4875, his company was tasked to clear a narrow feature with sharp cuttings on either side and heavily fortified enemy defences that covered the only approach to it. For speedy operation, Captain Batra assaulted the enemy position along a narrow ridge and engaged the enemy in a fierce hand –to-hand fight and killed five enemy soldiers at point blank range. Despite sustaining grave injuries, he crawled towards the enemy and hurled grenades clearing the position with utter disregard to his personal safety, leading from the front, he rallied his men and pressed on the attack and achieved a near impossible military task in the face of heavy enemy fire. The officer, however, succumbed to his injuries. Inspired by his daredevil act, his troops fell upon the enemy with vengeance, annihilated them and captured Point 4875.

Captain Vikram Batra, thus, displayed the most conspicuous personal bravery and leadership of the highest order in the face of the enemy and made the supreme sacrifice in the highest traditions of the Indian Army.

— Gazette of India Notification: No. 16 – Press/2000,

PARAMVEER CHAKRA TO RIFLEMAN SANJAY KUMAR

The Param Vir Chakra citation on the Official Indian Army Website reads as follows:

Rifleman Sanjay Kumar volunteered to be the leading scout of the attacking column tasked to capture area Flat Top of Point 4875 in the Mushkoh Valley on 4 July 1999. During the attack when enemy automatic fire from one of the sangars posed stiff opposition and stalled the column, Rifleman Sanjay Kumar realizing the gravity of the situation and with utter disregard to his personal safety, charged at the enemy. In the ensuing hand-to-hand combat, he killed three of the intruders and was himself seriously injured. Despite his injuries, he charged onto the second sangar. Taken totally by surprise, the enemy left behind a Universal Machine Gun and started running. Rifleman Sanjay Kumar picked up the UMG and killed the fleeing enemy. Although bleeding profusely, he refused to be evacuated. The brave action on his part motivated his comrades and they took no notice of the treacherous terrain and charged onto the enemy and wrested the area Flat Top from the hands of the enemy. Rifleman Sanjay Kumar displayed most conspicuous gallantry, cool courage and devotion to duty of an exceptionally high order in the face of the enemy.

CAPT. MANOJ KUMAR PANDEY PVC

CITATION PARAMVEER CHAKRA

LIEUTENANT MANOJ KUMAR PANDEY

1/11 GORKHA RIFLES

Lieutenant Manoj Kumar Pandey, a young officer of the 1/11 Gorkha Rifles, took part in a series of boldly led attacks during Operation Vijay, forcing back the intruders with heavy losses in Batalik, including the capture of Jubar Top.

His finest hour was during the advance to Khalubar, when he was Number 5 Platoon Commander. On the night of 2/3 July 1999, as the platoon approached its final objective, it came under heavy and intense enemy fire from the surrounding heights. The officer was tasked to clear the interfering enemy positions, so as to prevent his battalion from getting daylighted, being in a vulnerable position. The officer quickly moved his platoon to an advantageous position under intense enemy fire and sent one section to clear the enemy positions from the right, while he himself proceeded to clear four other enemy positions on the left. Fearlessly assaulting the first enemy position, he killed two enemy personnel and proceeded to assault the second and destroyed it by killing two more enemy personnel. Lieutenant Manoj Kumar Pandey was injured on the shoulder and legs by enemy fire while clearing the third position. Undaunted and without caring for his grievous injury, he led the assault on the fourth position urging his men and destroyed the same with a grenade, even as he got a fatal Medium Machine Gun burst on his forehead. It is this singular daredevil act of the officer, which provided the critical firm base for the companies, which finally led to capture of Khalubar.

Lieutenant Manoj Kumar Pandey, thus showed most conspicuous bravery, indomitable courage, exemplary personal valour, outstanding leadership and devotion to duty of an exceptionally high order, in the face of the enemy and made the supreme sacrifice in the highest traditions of the army.

Maha Vir Chakra citations:

Capt. ANUJ NAYYAR

Gazette Notification: 17 Pres/2000,15.8.99

Operation: Vijay – Kargil

Date of Award: 1999

Citation:

On 06 July 1999, Charlie Company was tasked to capture an objective, which was a part of the Pimple Complex on the Western Slopes of Point 4875, in the Mushkoh Valley. At the beginning of the attack the Company Commander got injured and the command of the company devolved on Captain Anuj Nayyar. Captain Nayyar continued to command his leading platoon into the attack under heavy enemy artillery and mortar fire. As the platoon advanced, the leading section reported location of 3 to 4 enemy positions. Captain Nayyar moved forward towards the first enemy position and fired rocket launcher and lobbed grenades into it. Thereafter, the section, along with Captain Nayyar, physically assaulted and cleared the position. The enemy, which was well entrenched, brought a heavy volume of automatic fire. Captain Anuj Nayyar, unmindful of his personal safety, motivated his men and cleared two more enemy positions. While clearing the fourth position an enemy rocket propelled grenade hit the officer killing him on the spot. This action led by Captain Anuj Nayyar resulted in killing nine enemy soldiers and destruction of three medium machine gun positions of the enemy. The success of this operation after a brief setback was largely due to the outstanding personal bravery and exemplary junior leadership of this daring officer. Captain Anuj Nayyar displayed indomitable resolve, grit and determination and motivated his command by personal example acting beyond the call of duty and made the supreme sacrifice in true traditions of the Indian Army.

MAJOR RAJESH SINGH ADHIKARI

Gazette Notification: 17 Pres/2000,15.8.99

Operation: Vijay - Kargil Date of Award: 1999

Citation:

On 30 May 1999, as a part of battalion operation to capture the Tololing feature, Major Rajesh Singh Adhikari was tasked to secure the initial foothold by capturing its forward spur where the enemy held a strong position. The enemy position was located in a treacherous mountainous terrain covered with snow at a height of about 15,000 feet. While Major Adhikari was leading his company towards the objective, he was fired at from two mutually supporting enemy positions with Universal machine guns. The officer immediately directed the rocket launcher detachment to engage the enemy position and killed two enemy soldiers in close quarter combat. Thereafter, the officer, displaying presence of mind under heavy fire, ordered his medium machine gun detachment to take position behind a rocky feature and engage the enemy. The assault party continued to inch their way up. While so advancing forward, Major Adhikari suffered grievous bullet injuries, yet he continued to direct his sub-unit. Refusing to be evacuated, then he charged at the second enemy position and killed one more occupant, thus capturing the second position at Tololing which later facilitated capture of Point 4590. However later he succumbed to his injuries. Major Rajesh Singh Adhikari displayed exceptional valour, outstanding leadership in the presence of the enemy and laid down his life in the highest traditions of the Indian Army.

LIEUTENANT KEISHING CLIFFORD NONGRUM

12 JAMMU AND KASHMIR LIGHT INFANTRY

On the night of 30 June/1 July 1999, in the operations to capture Point 4812 in the Batalik Sector, Lieutenant Keishing Clifford Nongrum was tasked to assault the feature from the southeastern direction. Lieutenant Keishing Clifford Nongrum led his column over the near impossible vertical feature. On reaching the top, his column encountered strong enemy opposition. The enemy was well entrenched in interconnected bunkers, carved out of boulders, and remained invulnerable to even artillery fire.

The enemy pinned down the column of Lieutenant Keishing Clifford Nongrum with heavy and accurate automatic fire for about two hours. On seeing the futility of own fire against the fortified enemy position, Lieutenant Keishing Nongrum, with utter disregard to his personal safety, charged through the fire zone. Closing in with the first position, he threw grenades into it and killed six enemy soldiers. He then tried to snatch the universal machine gun of the enemy from the second enemy position and received a volley of bullets.

The audacious action of Lieutenant Keishing Clifford Nongrum stunned the enemy giving valuable reaction time to his troops to close in and finally clear the position. Though severely wounded, Lieutenant Keishing Clifford Nongrum refused to be evacuated and fought valiantly till he succumbed to his injuries. This act resulted in the ultimate capture of Point 4812.

Lieutenant Keishing Clifford Nongrum displayed conspicuous bravery, dogged determination and raw courage in the face of the enemy and made the supreme sacrifice in the highest traditions of the Indian Army.

NAIK DIGENDRA KUMAR, MVC

CITATION

MAJOR PADMAPANI ACHARYA (IC-55072) 2 RAJPUTANA RIFLES

(POSTHUMOUS)

On 28 June 1999, Major Padmapani Acharya as a Company Commander, was assigned the formidable task of capturing an enemy position which was heavily fortified, strongly held and covered with mines and sweeping machine gun and artillery fire. Success of the battalion and brigade operation hinged on the early capture of this position. However the company attack almost faltered at the very beginning when the enemy's artillery fire came down squarely on the leading platoon, inflicting large numbers of casualties. With utter disregard to his personal safely, Major Acharya took the reserve platoon of his company and led it through raining artillery shells. Even as his men were falling to the murderous enemy fire, he continued to encourage his men and charged at the enemy up the steep rock face with his reserve platoon.

Unmindful of the hail of bullets from the enemy's position, Major Acharya crawled up to the enemy position and lobbed grenades. In this daring assault, he was seriously injured. Despite heavy injuries and unable to move, he ordered his men to leave him and charge at the enemy while he continued to fire at the enemy. The enemy position was finally over-run and the objective was captured. He, however, succumbed to his injuries after completion of the mission.

Lt Col Sonam Wangchuk, MVC

Gazette Notification: 17 Pres/2000,15.8.99

Operation: Vijay - Kargil

Date of Award: 1999 Citation:

On 30 May 1999, Major Sonam Wangchuk was leading a column of The Indus Wing, Ladakh Scouts as a part of ongoing operations in Op VIJAY in the Batalik Sector. The column was tasked to occupy Ridge Line on the Line of Control in a glaciated area at a height of about 5,500 metres. This was essential so as to pre-empt its occupation by the enemy and any subsequent infiltration. While moving towards the Line of Control, the enemy ambushed the column by firing from a vantage position. In the process, one NCO of The Ladakh Scouts was killed. Major Sonam Wangchuk held his column together and in a daring counter ambush, led a raid on the enemy position from a flank, killing two enemy soldiers. The officer also recovered one heavy machine gun and one Universal machine gun, ammunition, controlled stores and three dead bodies of the enemy personnel. Thereafter, the officer took stock of all forces along the Chorbatla axis in the Batalik Sector and cleared the axis up to the Line of Control of all enemy intrusions at great risk to his life.

Major Sonam Wangchuk displayed exceptional bravery and gallantry of the highest order in the presence of enemy fire and in extreme climatic conditions in the glaciated area.

Captain Neikezhakuo Kenguruse

The citation for the MVC awarded to him reads:

Captain Neikezhakuo Kenguruse was the Ghatak platoon commander during the attack on area ‘Black Rock’ in the Drass Sector on the night of 28 June 1999 during ‘Operation Vijay’. He volunteered to undertake a daring commando mission of attacking a well-sited enemy machine gun position, on a cliff face, which was heavily interfering with all the approaches to the main objective of the battalion. As the commando team scaled the cliff face, it came under intense mortar and automatic fire, which caused heavy casualties.

Captain Kenguruse sustained splinter injury in his abdomen. Bleeding profusely yet undeterred, he urged his men to carry on with the assault. On reaching the final cliff face, the commando team was halted by a sheer rock wall that separated them from the enemy machine gun post. Captain Kenguruse took off his shoes to get a good grip and scaled the rock wall carrying with him a rocket launcher, which he fired at the enemy position. Unmindful of his personal safety, he thereafter charged at the enemy position and personally killed two men with his rifle and another two with his commando knife in a hand-to-hand combat before succumbing to his injury.

By his dare devil act, Captain Neikezhakuo Kenguruse single handedly neutralized the enemy position, which had held up the battalion’s progress. He displayed conspicuous gallantry indomitable resolve, grit and determination beyond the call of duty and made the supreme sacrifice in the face of the enemy, in true traditions of the Indian Army.

MAJOR VIVEK GUPTA (IC-51152) 2 RAJPUTANA RIFLES

(POSTHUMOUS)

Major Vivek Gupta was in command of the leading Charlie Company, when 2 Rajputana Rifles launched a battalion attack on Tololing Top, in Drass sector on 13 June 1999. Inspite of heavy artillery and automatic fire, the company under the inspiring leadership of Major Vivek Gupta was able to close in with the enemy. As soon as the Company emerged in the open, they came under multidirectional intense fire. Three personnel of the leading section of the Company were hit and the attack was temporarily stalled. Knowing fully well that staying any longer in the open under the murderous enemy fire would lead to more losses, Major Vivek Gupta reacted immediately and fired a rocket launcher at the enemy position. Before the shocked enemy could recover, Major Vivek Gupta charged on to the enemy position. While so charging, he was hit by two bullets, despite which, he kept moving towards the position. On reaching the position, he engaged the enemy in fierce hand-to-hand combat and managed to kill three enemy soldiers despite his own injuries.

Taking inspiration form the gallant deed of their officer, the rest of the company charged onto the enemy position and captured it. However, in the ensuing combat, Major Vivek Gupta received another direct hit from enemy bullets and finally succumbed to his injuries. Major Vivek Gupta displayed conspicuous gallantry and inspiring leadership in the face of the enemy, which, ultimately led to the capture of Tololing Top.

LIEUTENANT BALWAN SINGH (SS-37691), 18 GRENADIERS

On 03 July 1999 Lieutenant Balwan Singh with his Ghatak platoon was tasked to assault the 'Tiger Hill Top' from the North Eastern direction as part of a multi pronged attack. The route to the objective situated at a height of 16,500 feet was snowbound and interspersed with crevasses and sheer falls. The officer, with just three months service, set about his task with single-minded determination. The team led and exhorted by him, moved for over twelve hours along a very difficult and precarious route and under intense artillery shelling to reach the designated spur.

This move took the enemy by complete surprise as his team used cliff assault mountaineering equipment to reach the top with stealth. On seeing the Ghataks, the enemy panicked and in a desperate firefight attempted to repulse the Ghataks. In the ensuing firefight, Lieutenant Balwan Singh was himself seriously injured. However his resolve to finish the enemy remained unshaken. He refused to be evacuated and unmindful of his injury, moved swiftly to encircle the enemy and engaged them in close combat and single handedly killed four enemy soldiers. The remaining enemy personnel opted to flee rather than face the fury of the fierce officer. His inspirational leadership, conspicuous courage and bravery were instrumental in the capture of Tiger Hill, which was operationally one of the most important objectives in the Drass sector.

Imliakum Ao

Captain Gurjinder Singh Suri

The Citation for the Maha Vir Chakra awarded to him reads:-

Captain Gurjinder Singh Suri was the Ghatak platoon commander and was located at the forward-defended locality in Jammu & Kashmir. On 9 November 1999, the enemy launched an attack on the post, which was successfully repulsed, and the enemy retreated. Seizing the opportunity, the Ghatak platoon was ordered to pursue the fleeing enemy. Captain Suri immediately deployed his support group to take care of any reinforcement or interference and set out to clear the bunkers one by one. When he saw that one comrade was grievously injured in the process, he quickly moved on with his buddy, to clear the bunker. He killed two enemy soldiers with his AK rifle and silenced the machine gun. However, in the process, he received a burst in his left arm. Unmindful of his injury, Captain Suri continued to inspire his men to accomplish the task. He then lobbed two hand grenades into a bunker and entered inside spraying bullets with his AK rifle killing one enemy soldier instantly. At this point, he was hit by an enemy rocket-propelled grenade and was critically wounded. He refused to be evacuated and continued to exhort his men till he breathed his last. Inspired by his leadership, the Ghataks fell upon the enemy with vengeance and annihilated them. Captain Gurjinder Singh Suri, thus, displayed conspicuous bravery and junior leadership of the highest order in the face of the enemy and in the process made the supreme sacrifice.

Withdrawal and final battles

Following the outbreak of armed fighting, Pakistan sought American help in de-escalating the conflict. Bruce Riedel, who was then an aide to President Bill Clinton, reported that US intelligence had imaged Pakistani movements of nuclear weapons to forward deployments for fear of the Kargil hostilities escalating into a wider conflict. However, President Clinton refused to intervene until Pakistan had removed all forces from the Indian side of the LOC.Following the Washington accord of 4 July 1999, when Sharif agreed to withdraw Pakistani troops, most of the fighting came to a gradual halt, but some Pakistani forces remained in positions on the Indian side of the LOC. In addition, the United Jihad Council (an umbrella for extremist groups) rejected Pakistan's plan for a climb-down, instead deciding to fight on.

The Indian army launched its final attacks in the last week of July in co-ordination with relentless attacks by the IAF, both by day and night, in their totally successful Operation Safed Sagar; as soon as the Drass subsector had been cleared of Pakistani forces, the fighting ceased on 26 July. The day has since been marked as Kargil Vijay Diwas (Kargil Victory Day) in India. By the end of the war, Pakistan had to withdraw under international pressure and due to pressure from continued fighting at battle front and left India in control of all territory south and east of the LOC, as was established in July 1972 as per the Simla Agreement.

Kargil War Memorial, India

The Kargil War memorial, built by the Indian Army, is located in Dras, in the foothills of the Tololing Hill. The memorial, located about 5 km from the city centre across the Tiger Hill, commemorates the martyrs of the Kargil War. A poem "Pushp Kii Abhilasha"[221] (Wish of a Flower) by Makhanlal Chaturvedi, a renowned 20th century neo-romantic Hindi poet, is inscribed on the gateway of the memorial greets visitors. The names of the soldiers who lost their lives in the War are inscribed on the Memorial Wall and can be read by visitors. A museum attached to the Kargil War Memorial, which was established to celebrate the victory of 'Operation Vijay', houses pictures of Indian soldiers, archives of important war documents and recordings, Pakistani war equipments and gear, and official emblems of the Army from the Kargil war.

A giant national flag, weighing 15 kg was hoisted at the Kargil war memorial to commemorate the 13th anniversary of India's victory in the war.

Jai hind jai hind ki sena

Vande Mataram